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action procedure and commercial litigation funding and suggests areas for 
reform.  Part 6 is the conclusion.   
This article is about the class action and Part IVA of the FCAA.  There will 
be some discussion on commercial litigation funding, but this is only to explain 
why there are problems with the class action procedure when a litigation funder 
is involved in the class action. 
I I  OVERVIEW OF TH E AUSTRALIAN CLASS ACTION 
A The procedure 
The class action in Australia came into effect in March 1992.6  Part IVA of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (“FCAA”) governs the class action 
procedure.  It is termed a “representative proceeding” in Australia.  Section 33C 
identifies the threshold criteria that must be met for a proceeding to be 
commenced as a representative proceeding in Australia: 
[W]here: 
(a) seven or more persons have claims against the same person; and 
the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the 
same, similar or related circumstances; and 
(b) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common 
issue of law or fact; 
(c) a proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those 
persons as representing some or all of them. 
In effect, a class action is possible if (a) seven or more persons have claims 
against the same defendant; (b) their claims are in respect of or arise out of the 
same, similar or related circumstances; and (c) they have a substantial common 
issue of law or fact.  These are the threshold requirements for commencing a 
class action in Australia.  If these requirements are met, then any person in that 
group can commence a class action on his or her own behalf and on behalf of 
other persons referred to in s.33C.7 
Section 33H sets out the type of document required to be filed in court to 
commence a class action.  It reads: 
(1) An application commencing a representative proceeding, or a 
document filed in support of such an application, must, in 
addition to any other matters required to be included: 
(a) describe or otherwise identify the group members to whom 
the proceeding relates; and 
6 Victoria also has class action provisions similar to the Federal legislation.  The class action in 
Victoria is located in Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic.) and it came into effect in 
January 2000.  For ease of discussion, this article will focus only on Part IVA of the Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976 (C’th).    
7 Section 33D, FCAA 
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(b) specify the nature of the claims made on behalf of the group 
members and the relief claimed; and 
(c) specify the questions of law or fact common to the claims of 
the group members. 
(2) In describing or otherwise identifying group members for the 
purposes of subsection (1), it is not necessary to name, or specify 
the number of, the group members. 
In other words, the drafting of the originating process and/or the statement of 
claim must comply with s.33H.  The representative plaintiff is required to prove 
that he or she satisfies the class membership as identified in the originating 
process and/or the statement of claim.  In short, the drafter of the statement of 
claim must comply with s.33C. 
An important point to note under s.33H(2) is that it is not necessary for 
the originating process or the statement of claim to contain names of the group 
members or to specify the number of group members.  This means that the 
representative plaintiff may be representing numerous unidentified group 
members who may be eligible to participate in the class action but may choose 
to remain anonymous for as long as possible.  These unidentified group 
members may decide to come forward only when they hear of the successful 
outcome in the class action or when they hear about an out of court settlement, 
at which time they may decide to identify themselves and put in a claim for a 
share of the winnings.8  The delay in coming forward could be as late as when 
they hear about the proposed settlement.  
Section 33X and 33Y provide the court with a broad discretion to 
determine when and how a notice is to be served on the group members and to 
determine the content of the notice and the manner of service, and such notice 
may be given “by means of press advertisement, radio or television broadcast or 
by any other means”.  There is no requirement for a party to inform the group 
members personally unless the court determines that it is reasonably practical 
and not unduly expensive.9  However, the failure of a group member to receive 
or to respond to a notice does not affect the next step in the proceeding or the 
judgment given in the proceeding.10 
Section 33J provides a way for group members to opt out of the class action.  
It reads: 
(1) The Court must fix a date before which a group member may opt 
out of a representative proceeding. 
8 Section 33E of the FCAA does not require consent from a representative plaintiff to be a group 
member, which means that any person who satisfies the criteria under s.33C and who identifies 
himself as being in the group as described in the originating process as required by s.33H will be 
a group member in that particular class action and be entitled to claim for a share of the 
compensation. 
9 Section 33Y(5) of the FCAA 
10 Section 33Y(8) of the FCAA 
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(2) A group member may opt out of the representative proceeding by 
written notice given under the Rules of Court before the date so 
fixed. 
(3) The Court ... may fix another date so as to extend the period 
during which a group member may opt out of the representative 
proceeding. 
(4) ... 
Essentially s.33J provides group members with an opportunity to opt out if they 
do not wish to be bound by the decision in the class proceeding.11  Members 
can opt out of the proceeding by filing a notice in court before the due date as 
set out by the court. 
B Problems with the “opt out” provision 
Later in this article, shareholder class actions will be used to illustrate why the 
opt out model is ineffective when a litigation funder is involved in the case.  For 
now, the opt out provision in itself has its own problems. 
There is a lack of clarity and purpose in the opt-out provision.  It is not 
clear what the implications will be if a group member who wishes to opt out of 
the class action has not in fact opted out by the due date.  Normally in this 
instance, a member is bound by the decision of the court.12  However, there are 
two possible scenarios on why some group members have not taken part in the 
claim for a share of the compensation in the successful class action.  First, it 
could be that some members were not aware of the existing class action; and 
second, it could be that the compensation amount overall might be too small or 
insufficient to cover the losses that they may decide that there is no point in 
putting in a claim.  The question then is whether these group members should 
be given leniency and be permitted to pursue a court action on their own, for 
example an oppression action under Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(C’th) if the member is a shareholder.  Section 33J has not provided any 
exception to cover these situations, which could pose a number of problems.  
1 Some members may be missing out on a claim for compensation 
Section 33J states that a group member who does not want to be a part of the 
class proceeding may file a notice in court to opt out.  However, the provision 
provides no guidance on how a group member can go about opting out.  
Generally, it is unlikely that any person would make any decision about the 
class proceeding in respect to whether or not to opt out unless: 
(a) the person is aware of the class proceeding at the relevant time; 
11 Section 33ZB of the FCAA refers to the judgment of the court as binding on all group 
members, except those who have opted out of the class action. 
12 Section 33ZB(b) of the FCAA 
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(b) the person has been informed that he or she is an eligible member of 
that class; and 
(c) the person has received sufficient information regarding the advantages 
and disadvantages of opting out of the class proceeding. 
It is not uncommon to find many people in the community to be ignorant of 
their legal rights.  There are people who cannot financially afford to engage a 
lawyer to ask the question: “Am I eligible to be a member of that class action?”  
In King v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, the court ruled that the statement of 
claim must define group membership with clarity, as this would enable people 
to decide their eligibility status and to decide whether they should opt out of 
that class proceeding.13  However, without adequate legal advice, the majority of 
people in the general public would have difficulty in understanding the 
significance of that point.  People are often reluctant to make any decision if 
they do not have a clear understanding of the law. 
The other difficulty is, even if people have some understanding that they 
are eligible to be in that class proceeding, they may not have sufficient 
information to weigh up for themselves the advantages and disadvantages of 
opting out, and again they may be financially constrained in seeking legal 
advice.  The alternative for these people would be to do nothing under s.33J. 
In Bright v. Femcare, the court noted that, “ in many cases a substantial 
number of members of the represented group will be unknown”.14  Cashman, in 
reference to class proceedings, made a similar comment that “the identity of all 
of the affected individuals will also be difficult, if not possible, to ascertain…”.15  
Clearly, there will always be members who do not know whether they are in the 
group proceedings or not in the group proceedings.  Elderly and fragile people 
and migrants with limited English are the ones who may be most at risk of not 
knowing what to do and are therefore less likely to make inquiries.  These 
people will often miss out on making a claim for compensation as a member. 
It is questionable whether a group member who has not opted out at the 
relevant time can later pursue a separate court action.  Although, it is clear that 
the provision provides an opportunity for a group member to opt out of the 
class action, there is a general lack of clarity on the actual purpose and intent. 
2 Some members may not want to take part in the claim for compensation 
Another complication with s.33J is that some group members may be 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the class proceeding and may not want to take 
13 King v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2001] FCA 270.  This case will be discussed further in 
Part 4 of this article. 
14 Bright v. Femcare [2000] FCA 1179 at [19] (per Lehane J) 
15 P. Cashman, “Class actions on behalf of clients: Is this permissible?” (2006) 80 Australian Law 
Journal 738 at 738 
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part in the claim for compensation.  The difficulty arises when these members 
have not opted out of the class proceedings as per s.33.  Their intention is to 
have a second attempt at suing the same defendant, perhaps on a different 
ground in the hope of a better outcome.  The problem for the court would be to 
decide whether these members can still bring a court action on their own, such 
as an oppression action under Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act 2001 (C’th) 
which a minority shareholder can pursue, or whether the court can reject their 
applications for a second hearing.    
A minority shareholder can bring an “oppression” action if the conduct of 
the company’s affairs or the act of the directors is: 
contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or oppressive to, 
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against a member or 
members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.16  
The advantage of bringing an oppression action is that the remedy awarded by 
the court may be personal to the shareholder.  There is a long list of remedies 
available to a shareholder in a successful oppression action.17  For example, the 
court can order the company to buy back shares currently held by the 
oppressed shareholder. 
In an attempt to sue the same defendant again, some group members may 
rely on the argument that they had no knowledge of the previous class action, 
or they did not know they were eligible to be in that class, and therefore they 
did not know about the need to opt out of the class action under s.33J. 
Currently there is no case law dealing with this issue.  However, the above 
scenario does present a need for consideration as to whether s.33J needs to be 
made clearer to avoid multiple interpretations and outcomes. 
I I I  COM M ERCIAL LITIGATION FUNDING  
As mentioned earlier, s.33J provides an opportunity for group members to opt 
out of the class action if they do not wish to be bound by the court decision.  
However, since commercial litigation funding has become available in 2006, it 
has become more difficult for members to exercise their right to opt out under 
s.33J.  This difficulty is not imposed by the legislative framework (because the 
class action provisions have not changed) but is imposed by a litigation funder 
through its written agreement with group members who need funding to 
commence a class action.  Below is a brief discussion of how commercial 
litigation funding works.  The key point is that the underlying purpose of s.33J 
has become blurred when there is a commercial litigation funder involved in 
16 Section 232, Corporations Act 2001 (C’th) 
17 Section 233 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (C’th) provides a list of 10 different 
orders that the Court can make in a successful oppression claim, and the list does not include 
damages.  
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the class proceeding.  
A Commercial litigation funding 
In 2006 in the case of Campbells Cash and Carry v. Fostif (“Fostif”), the High 
Court by a majority of 5:2 permitted a commercially funded retailer class action 
to proceed.18  This was the first case where the High Court formally accepted 
the important role of a commercial litigation funder in court proceedings.  The 
High Court found that litigation funding by a third party was not contrary to 
public policy nor was it an abuse of process.19  It was noted that the idea of 
commercial litigation funding had made it possible for some plaintiffs to bring 
their case to court and seek justice.20  Kirby J added:21 
… The individual claim may (as in the case of many tobacco retailers 
in these proceedings) be comparatively small and hardly worth the 
expense and trouble of suing. But the aggregate of the claims of those 
willing to proceed together, as proposed by a funder and organiser 
such as Firmstones, might be very large indeed. What is a theoretical 
possibility, as an individual action or series of actions, needs therefore 
to be converted into a practical case by the intervention of someone 
willing to undertake a test case (258), followed by others willing to 
organise litigants in a similar position, and under appropriate 
conditions, to recover their legal rights by helping them to act together. 
In Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Limited,22 a shareholder class action 
case, Finkelstein J of the Federal Court of Australia made a similar comment:23 
The advantage of the retainer and the funding agreements to each 
group member is obvious.  If it were not for those agreements and the 
class action procedure, the action would probably not have gotten off 
18 Campbells Cash and Carry v. Fostif [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Crennan JJ; with Callinan and Heydon JJ dissenting) 
19 This ruling was further supported by the High Court in a subsequent case, Jeffrey and 
Katauskas Pty Ltd v. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd (2009) 83 ALJR 1180 (French CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ; with Heydon J dissenting). 
20 It should be noted that the decision in Campbells Cash and Carry v. Fostif [2006] HCA 41; 
(2006) 229 CLR 386 marks the end of the doctrines relating to maintenance and champerty in 
Australia.  Historically, maintenance (improperly encouraging litigation) and champerty 
(receiving a share of the win in exchange for maintaining the court case) were strictly prohibited 
in all Australian jurisdictions.  For a discussion of the development of the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty, see the judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in 
Campbells Cash &  Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 CLR 386. See also 
Damian Grave and Ken Adam, Class Actions in Australia, 2nd edition, 2012, Thomson Reuters 
21 Campbells Cash and CarryPty Ltd  v. FostifPty Ltd  [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 CLR 386, at 
449 (per Kirby J); Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ expressed similar sentiment in 
the same case 
22 Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Limited [2007] FCA 1061 
23 Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Limited [2007] FCA 1061, at para 34 (Finkelstein J). 
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the ground.  Individually, most group members would not have the 
financial strength to bring their opponents to court.  For those that do 
the potential benefits of bringing an action would be outweighed by 
the quantum of the costs. 
Currently, a commercial litigation funder is not required to have an Australian 
Financial Services Licence (AFSL).  In International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd 
v. Chameleon Mining NL (receivers and Managers Appointed),24 the High Court 
was requested to interpret the term “managed investment scheme” under 
chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (C’th) to determine whether a litigation 
funder was required to have an AFSL.  It was held that commercial litigation 
funding was not a managed investment scheme as such and thus the funder was 
exempt from the requirement of an AFSL.  Subsequently, the legislature passed 
a piece of law on 13 January 2013 to confirm the High Court’s interpretation on 
this point.25 
At present, the only specific law that a litigation funder is required to 
comply with, which came into effect on 13 January 2013, is putting together a 
plan for managing conflict of interests with the clients and with the clients’ 
lawyers.26  There are no other specific laws that govern litigation funders.      
Unlike lawyer’s professional fees that are regulated by specific legislation, a 
commercial litigation funder is not subject to any fees restriction.  A litigation 
funder is free to impose any fees on group members for financing their class 
proceeding.  
Overall, the litigation funding industry is still largely unregulated and this 
may have accounted for the rise in the number of shareholder class actions in 
Australia since 2006.  The government has been under pressure to introduce 
laws to monitor commercial litigation funders.  In its latest report, Access to 
Justice Arrangement, released on 3rd December 2014, the Productivity 
Commission made several recommendations:27  
The Australian Government should establish a licence for third party 
litigation funding companies designed to ensure they hold adequate 
capital relative to their financial obligations and properly inform 
24 International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v. Chameleon Mining NL (receivers and Managers 
Appointed) [2012] HCA 45 
25 The Corporations Amendment Regulations 2012 (No.6) was passed on 12 July 2012 and came 
into effect on 13 January 2013.  The relevant provision is now located in reg 5C.11.01 of the 
Corporations Regulations 2001 (C’th) 
26 Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No.6).  Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission has put together a set of guidelines, known as ASIC Regulatory Guide 248, for 
litigation funders to follow. 
27 Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report on Access to Justice Arrangements, Volume 2, Final 
Report No 72, 5 September 2014, Canberra, Recommendation 18.2 at page 633.  The Report was 
released for public viewing on 3rd December 2014.  
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clients of relevant obligations and systems for managing risks and 
conflicts of interest.  
• Regulation of the ethical conduct of litigation funders should 
remain a function of the courts.  
• The licence should require litigation funders to be members of 
the Financial Ombudsman Scheme.  
• Where there are any remaining concerns relating to categories of 
funded actions, such as securities class actions, these should be 
addressed directly, through amendments to underlying laws, 
rather than through any further restrictions on litigation funding. 
This Report is currently being considered in Parliament. 
B How does commercial litigation funding work? 
A commercial litigation funder makes its money from funding court cases, 
mostly class actions.  Group members who agree to sign the funding agreement 
with a litigation funder will effectively be opting into the funding arrangement.  
Common practice is that a litigation funder will fund all legal costs and 
expenses incurred in the class action such as a shareholder class action, and this 
includes providing any security for costs required by the court.28  In return, 
group members must agree to:29 
(1) pay all costs and expenses to the litigation funder when there is a 
successful outcome in the class action or when a group member 
withdraws from the case before it is settled; and 
(2) pay the litigation funder an agreed commission from the amount 
recovered in the successful class action, and this could either be an 
agreed settlement approved by the court or through a final court 
judgment.   
Given that the commercial litigation funding industry is still largely 
unregulated, the commission for which a litigation funder can charge is 
unlimited.  It has been known that a litigation funder has charged a 
commission of two-thirds of the net recovery from a successful class action.30  
As will be seen later in this article, the courts have had a chance to monitor the 
litigation funding agreements, but have not issued an order to scale back the 
28 See, Morabito V, “Corporate Accountability, Third Parties and Class Actions” from Corporate 
Law and Accountability Research Group, Working Paper No. 3, October 2006, at pp.17-18. 
29 The way these two conditions work is illustrated in the analysis of shareholder class action 
cases in Part 4 of this article. 
30 See Morabito V, “Corporate Accountability, Third Parties and Class Actions” from Corporate 
Law and Accountability Research Group, Working Paper No. 3, October 2006, at p.18; see also a 
report from the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Litigation Funding in Australia 
(Discussion Paper, May 2006) p.4.    
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litigation funder’s fees.    
Generally, the funding agreement is prepared in a way that benefits the 
litigation funder.  When a group member decides to opt out of the funding 
arrangement or decides to opt out of the class action under s.33J, the group 
member is expected to reimburse legal costs and expenses already incurred for 
commencing the class action.       
The term “commercial litigation funding agreement” is not the same as the 
term “contingency fees agreement”, the latter being commonly used in the 
United States. 31   Australian law prohibits the use of “contingency fees 
agreement” or “contingency fees arrangement”.32  Instead, the “commercial 
litigation funding agreement” is the alternative as approved by the High Court 
in 2006.  The key difference between the two is that in a contingency fees 
arrangement, as used in the United States, lawyers acting for the client have an 
agreement to deduct a portion of the net recovery if there is a successful 
outcome in the court case.  By contrast, a commercial litigation funding 
arrangement is usually an agreement between a third party litigation funder 
and the lawyers’ client; this arrangement works in Australia as a way of 
avoiding any conflict of interests between the lawyers and the client. A third 
party litigation funder is not constrained by the same prohibition as the acting 
lawyers.33 
IV  SH AREH OLDER CLASS ACTIONS AND ITS INTERACTION WITH  
COM M ERCIAL LITIGATION FUNDING 
These days, the majority of the class action cases are commercially funded.34  
The discussion under this part is to review several of the more important 
shareholder class actions in order to understand how the operation of s.33J has 
become blurred when a commercial litigation funder is involved.      
  
31 For reading on the United States contingency fees arrangement, see Macey JR and Miller GP, 
“The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 1.  See also, 
Lambert KA, “Class Action Settlements in Louisiana”, (2000) 61 Louisiana Law Review 89; and 
Mulheron R, The Class Action in Common Law Legal System: A Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 
32 See, for example, Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 3.4.29(1)(b); Legal Profession Act 2006 
(ACT) s 285; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 325(1)(b); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 
320(1); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 325; Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 2003 
(SA) r 42; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s 309(1); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 285(1).  
33 For further reading relating to “contingency fees arrangement” and other fees structures, see 
Damian Grave and Ken Adam, Class Actions in Australia (2012). 
34 See also a report from V. Morabito, “Litigation Funders, Competing Class Actions, Opt Out 
Rates, Victorian Class Actions and Class Representatives”,  Australian Research Council, 
September 2010 (Second report) 
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In the majority of the shareholder class action cases, the claims have been 
typically about investment losses.  Shareholders claimed that the company and 
its directors and officers had engaged in activities that constituted a breach of 
the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions under the Corporations Act 
2001 (C’th).  Directors and officers of the company had provided inaccurate or 
incomplete financial statements,35 and/or the company had failed to comply 
with the continuous disclosure obligations.36   
A King v GIO Australia Holdings Limited (2000) 
King v GIO Australia Holdings Limited37 was the first shareholder class action in 
Australia.  This case had no third party litigation funding.  King was a 
shareholder of GIO Australia Holdings Limited (“the company”).  He engaged 
a law firm to assist on a “no win no fee” basis and launched a class action 
against the company and its former board of directors in August 1999.38 
The claim was that in 1998, in an attempt to defend a hostile takeover from 
AMP Limited, the board of directors of GIO Australia had negligently or 
through misleading or deceptive conduct, issued a number of statements to its 
shareholders urging them not to sell their GIO shares to AMP Limited that 
offered a price of $5.35 per share.  Many of the GIO shareholders took notice 
and kept their shares.  Six months later, GIO Australia suffered a loss of $2 
billion and its’ share price dropped to $2.75 per share.   
The class action began in August 1999 with a small pool of group members.  
It was estimated that about 67,000 shareholders were entitled to participate in 
the class action,39 many of whom were small individual investors.  By 2001, the 
same law firm originally engaged by King represented about 22,000 GIO 
shareholders.  Furthermore, about 18,000 shareholders had formally filed a 
notice in court to opt out of the proceedings.40  The remainder of the GIO 
35 Relevant provisions are ss.670A, 953A, 1022A, 1041E, 1041F, 1041H, 1308 and 1309 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (C’th); and s.12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (C’th) 
36 Chapter 6-6D of the Corporations Act 2001 (C’th) covers continuous disclosure obligations.  
ASX also has Listing Rules that apply to all listed companies, including rules on compliance with 
continuous disclosures. 
37 King v GIO Australia Holdings Limited (2000) 174 ALR 715 at 725, 100 FCR 209 at 222-223, 
[2000] FCA 1543 at [7]; King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) 
[2003] FCA 980 
38 “No-win no-fee” means if the outcome of the case is successful, then the law firm may charge a 
time-based rate increased by a multiplication factor or an agreed additional amount permitted 
under the relevant Legal Profession Act.  The plaintiff may request the final charged amount to 
be reviewed by a taxing master from the relevant court if the amount appears overly excessive. 
39 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 980, at 
para 4 
40 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 980, at 
para 4 
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shareholders did not come forward to join in with the class action nor did they 
opt out of the proceeding.41  The defendants contested the claim.  However, by 
August 2003 and with the approval of the court, the defendants agreed to settle 
and pay $97 million in compensation to the shareholders and $11 million in 
legal costs.42  It was held by the court that all eligible shareholders, who had not 
opted out of the class action, were entitled to be compensated and the sum of 
their entitlement was based on the size of their share ownership. 
In this case, there was no confusion over the use of s.33J.  There was no 
need for the court to try to interpret s.33J.  It was clear that shareholders could 
choose to opt out of the class action and could freely do so by putting in a 
notice to the court with their clear intention to opt out. 
B Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2003) 
Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (“Dorajay”) was the first commercially 
funded shareholder class action.43  This case commenced in 2003 with the 
support of a commercial litigation funder, IMF (Australia) Limited.44  There 
were 556 shareholders who signed the funding agreement and about 2,331 
other shareholders who did not sign the agreement.  Again, the claim was about 
misleading or deceptive statements on the balance sheets in that the company 
and its board of directors had overstated the profits, and as such the 
shareholders had incurred a loss when they bought shares from the company. 
In an attempt to strike out the case, the defendant focused its argument on 
s.33J and argued that the use of a litigation funder as a way for the plaintiff to 
represent only the funded group members was not permitted under s.33J.  The 
defendant argued that by requiring group members to sign the funding 
agreement, the funder had created a situation where 556 shareholders had 
“opted into” the class action and this, the defendant argued was inconsistent 
with the opt out mechanism in s.33J.   
As noted in the above, this was the first shareholder class action case in 
Australia funded by a commercial litigation funder.  Previously, there was a 
common law rule prohibiting this type of funding, known as the rule against 
maintenance and champerty.  This common law prohibited an improper 
encouragement of litigation and prohibited an improper payment or receipt of 
a share of the win in exchange for the maintenance of a court action.45  The 
41 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 980, at 
para 6 
42 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 1420 
43 Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 394 
44 IMF (Australia) Limited was a company listed in Australia that had no relation to the 
International Monetary Fund.  The company is now known as IMF Bentham Limited.   
45 See the judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Campbells Cash &  Carry Pty Ltd v 
Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 CLR 386 for a discussion of the development of the 
doctrines. 
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court in Dorajay was called upon for the first time to determine the scope and 
purpose of s.33J, whether the idea of third party litigation funding would 
contravene the common law rule against maintenance and champerty to the 
point of rendering s.33J inoperable.   
In the preliminary hearing in 2005, Stone J of the Federal Court was 
against the idea of commercial litigation funding.  Her Honour noted that the 
legislature had “made a clear choice” for an “opt out” class action.46  Stone J 
stated:47 
I find that the requirement that group members opt in to the 
proceeding to be inconsistent with the terms and policy of Part IVA.  It 
is inappropriate that the proceeding continue under Part IVA while 
the criterion is part of the description of the representative group.  I 
also find that, in the way in which the criterion subverts the opt out 
process, it is an abuse of the court’s processes as established by Part 
IVA. 
However in 2008 and similar to the earlier case in King v. GIO Australia, the 
defendant in the present case also agreed to settle and pay $144.5 million in 
compensation.  The amount was approved by Stone J with a condition that all 
shareholders, regardless of whether they had signed the funding agreement, 
were entitled to participate in the share of the compensation equally.  That is, 
both the funded group members and non-funded group members were to be 
treated equally in their claims for compensation.  To ensure that the non-
funded group members were able to participate in the recovery plan, the court 
ordered Maurice Blackburn, solicitors acting for the funded group, to send 
notices to all individual non-funded members to inform them of the proposed 
settlement.  They were given a chance to submit their proof of claim to be 
considered by the court, by the date for which the court then closed the group 
for settlement.48 
An important point to note in this case was that Stone J concluded that all 
group members should be given the same opportunity to opt out of the class 
action under s.33J regardless of whether they were from the funded group or 
non-funded group, and if they chose not to opt out, then they would all be 
entitled to receive a share of the win under the current class action regime, 
regardless of whether they had participated in the group proceeding.  
C Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd (2007) 
The courts in Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd 49 (“Multiplex”) had 
produced a different conclusion.  Both the original court and the appellate 
46 Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 394, at 429 (Stone J) 
47 Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 394, at 431 (Stone J) 
48 Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Limited (2008) 67 ACSR 569 
49 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061; affirmed [2007] FCAFC 200 
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court took a different approach in dealing with the opt-out mechanism.  Both 
courts formed the view that the procedure in Part IVA, particularly under 
s.33C, permitted a class action to be structured with a closed group, and 
members in this closed group could still opt out of the class proceedings under 
s.33J.  Being a commercially funded shareholder class action, the courts noted 
that it might be financially unattractive for the funded group members to opt 
out but it was not impossible. 
This case was about misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of 
Multiplex Ltd (the “company”) and its directors.  Briefly, the company entered 
into a contract to build a stadium.  Problems started to appear when there was a 
delay in the completion of the work.  As a result of the long delay, the final costs 
of the construction exceeded the original estimate, and the company also 
suffered a massive drop in profit and share value.  Dawson Nominees, one of 
the shareholders of the company, sought to recover its losses by claiming that 
the company had failed to disclose the extent of the cost increase and had failed 
to inform of the long delay in the construction.50 
A law firm (“MBC”) independently investigated the strength of the claims 
and decided that shareholders had a strong chance of success in court 
proceedings.  MBC then went onto the radio and encouraged other Multiplex 
shareholders to come forward to commence a class action.  Dawson Nominees 
agreed to be the representative plaintiff in the class action.  The facts revealed 
that shareholders had to sign two separate agreements to commence a class 
action; first the MBC’s solicitors’ retainer agreement and second, the litigation 
funding agreement with International Litigation Fund (“ILF”).  Both 
agreements had similar terms, with the effect that the financial arrangement 
would be terminated if a group member: (a) terminated any of the two 
agreements; or (b) settled the claim individually and personally with the 
defendant; or (c) filed a notice in court to opt out of the class action under s.33J.  
In addition, a group member who decided to terminate the funding 
arrangement would have to reimburse all necessary legal costs and expenses 
and pay an agreed portion of the net recovery if any as commission.   
In an attempt to strike out the class action, the company argued in defence 
that the MBC/ILF scheme was contrary to Part IVA, in that group members 
had no opportunity to opt out under s.33J.  The defendant relied on the 
decision in Dorajay for support.  
In the first instance, Finkelstein J rejected the defendant’s argument and 
held that there was nothing in the two agreements that would prevent the 
50 Breaches of the misleading or deceptive conduct were raised under s.674 and s.1041H(1) of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (C’th), under s.12DA(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (C’th) and under the old s.52 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (C’th).  
The latter has now been brought forward to s.18 of the Consumer and Competition Act 2010 
(C’th) with substantially identical terms. 
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funded group members from opting out under s.33J.51  It was held that the 
funded group members could opt out at anytime under s.33J and that it was not 
for the court to consider whether it was financially viable for them to opt out.  
Further, group members were not required to pay any amount upfront under 
the agreements, and thus it would be unlikely to see any of them wanting to 
withdraw from the class action.52 
In his interpretation of s.33C(1), Finkelstein J. formed the view that it was 
possible to structure a class action with group membership limiting to “a subset 
of all possible plaintiffs”.53  His Honour went on to say that “the only persons 
excluded from the group [were] free riders” and this was not inconsistent with 
Part IVA.54  His Honour stated that the ability to limit the group size was from 
the last part of the sentence in s.33C(1) which in part stated that “a proceeding 
may be commenced by one or more of those persons as representing some or 
all of them”.55  There are three reasons to explain why the class action must 
have a limit in the membership size: (1) limiting the group would provide each 
group member an incentive to contribute to the class action; (2) limiting the 
group to a manageable level would help to make the class action easier to settle; 
and (3) limiting the group would enable each group member a greater prospect 
of receiving a higher percentage of compensation when all costs and expenses 
had been accounted for.56 
Finkelstein J was critical of the decision in Dorajay, saying:57 
The judge took a narrower view and held that the criterion was bad 
simply because it required a person to opt into the group proceeding.  
The problem with this approach is that the judge found the [law firm] 
criterion amounts to an illegitimate opt in procedure without really 
analysing why it was an opt in procedure … She did not say how her 
analysis was consistent with Parliament’s rejection of the [A]LRC’s 
recommendation that class actions should be brought on behalf of all 
affected persons. 
On appeal, the Full Federal Court unanimously sided with Finkelstein J and 
dismissed the defendant’s argument.58  Both Lindgren and Jacobson JJ spent 
much of their time analysing the scope of s.33C and its connection with other 
provisions in Part IVA.  Lindgren J noted that s.33C permitted class 
proceedings to be brought on behalf of “some or all”  of the potential group 
51 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 38 
52 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 52 
53 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 17 
54 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 48 
55 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 15, and 39 
56 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, para 48 
57 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 62 
58 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200, 
(French, Lindgren and Jacobson JJ) 
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members.59  Jacobson J made a similar comment and concluded that s.33C 
permitted the plaintiff “to commence a proceeding on behalf of less than all of 
the potential members of the group”.60  On the point of opting out, all justices 
formed the view that the funding agreement could not have prevented the 
shareholders from opting out; group members could still opt out of the class 
action at anytime under s.33J.61    
The Full Federal Court however rejected Finkelstein J’s criticism of the 
decision in Dorajay and concluded that the case was “correctly decided”62 as the 
facts in that case were “distinguishable”.63 
Similar to the previous class actions, the defendant agreed to settle and pay 
$110 million in compensation to the shareholders. 
The importance of the Multiplex decision may be summed up as follows.  
First, the decision in Dorajay is still good law, in the sense that group members 
can still exercise their right to opt out of the class action under s.33J.  However, 
when a litigation funder is involved, then according to the courts’ reasoning in 
Multiplex, it may be possible for a class action to be structured in a way where 
members are within a “closed” group and these members in the “closed” group 
can opt out under s.33J.  In effect, it may be possible for a “closed” group of 
claimants to exclude other potential claimants who have not signed the 
litigation funding agreement.  Second, it may be possible for several class 
actions to be running simultaneously, with members from different “closed” 
groups signing litigation funding agreements with different funders.  The 
overall effect of the decision in Multiplex is to exclude free riders from 
participating in the receipt of benefits from the successful class action.   
D Kirby v. Centro Properties Limited (No.6) (2012) 
Kirby v. Centro Properties Limited (No.6) was another commercially funded 
shareholder class action case.64  It appears that the court was no longer 
concerned with the purpose and application of the opt out provision in s.33J.  
The court in this case had essentially adopted the Multiplex approach and did 
not see s.33J as an issue where a litigation funder was involved. That is, given 
59 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200 (per 
Lindgren J) para 5, 10 and 11.  Examples of provisions that could provide a broad construction 
of s.33C were ss.33D, 33E, 33F, 33G and 33N. 
60 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200, (per 
Jacobson J), at para 111 
61 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200, at para 
146 and 150 (per Jacobson J, with whom French and Lindgren JJ agreed)  
62 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200, at para 
171 (per Jacobson J) 
63 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v. Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 200, at para 
143 (per Jacobson J) 
64 Kirby v. Centro Properties Limited (No.6) [2012] FCA 650 
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the growing acceptance of the role of commercial litigation funding in 
shareholder class actions, the interpretation of s.33J has become “less 
important”. 
This case involved two separate class actions run by two different law firms.  
There were about 6000 shareholders in the two cases, with one law firm, Slater 
and Gordon, representing 5000 individual shareholders and the second law 
firm, Maurice Blackburn, representing 1000 other retailer shareholders.  IMF 
Limited65 was the provider of litigation funding for the class action run by the 
second law firm.   
In short, shareholders claimed that they had suffered investment losses 
because of the alleged breaches of the reporting obligations by Centro 
Properties Group.  They claimed that there were significant errors in the 
auditing report, that a short-term debt was wrongly classified as a long-term 
debt, and that a number of company guarantees had not been included in the 
audit.  Both cases commenced about the same time.  Given the common claims 
in both cases, the court found it convenient to join these two class actions into 
one. 
Half way through the trial and with the approval of the court, the 
defendant agreed to settle the claims with a payout figure of $200 million, 
which is still the largest settlement sum in Australia for a shareholder class 
action.  Group members who had registered with either of the two law firms 
were entitled to a share of the settlement. 
In this case, there was no dispute over the wording of the opt-out provision 
in s.33J.  It seemed that after the Multiplex decision, the court had simply 
accepted that a commercially funded class action had become common practice 
in Australia.  There was no lengthy discussion on how difficult or easy for 
group members to opt out of the proceedings under s.33J.   
Justice Middleton of the Federal Court was somewhat pleased to see an end 
to this class action.  His Honour noted that if the case were to continue, the 
final decision would hinge “on difficult and controversial points of law and 
appeals would be inevitable”.66  He added that, “such a process brings greater 
uncertainty to recovery, and would involve substantial delay even if liability 
were to be established.”67  From that statement, one could say that the court was 
concerned with the lack of clarity in the class action procedure.  This in effect 
could lead to greater uncertainty for group members if the case were to 
continue. 
 
65 IMF Limited was a company that had no relationship to the International Monetary Fund. 
66 Kirby v. Centro Properties Limited (No.6) [2012] FCA 650, para 4 
67 Kirby v. Centro Properties Limited (No.6) [2012] FCA 650, para 4 
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E Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited 
(2013) 
Another case worth mentioning is Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT 
Management Holdings Limited (“GPT Management”),68 where 92% of the 
shareholders had signed both the litigation funding agreement and the lawyers’ 
retainer agreement and 8% had not signed any agreement.  Instead, those 8% of 
the shareholders were free riders.  A term in the funding agreement stated that 
the litigation funder would receive a commission of 25-30% from the net 
recoveries after all litigation costs had been reimbursed.  An interesting point to 
note in this case is that the court appeared not to follow the decision in 
Multiplex, instead the approach in the present case was quite similar to the 
approach taken in Dorajay.   
The grounds for a class action were similar to those raised in the earlier 
cases.  Shareholders claimed they had suffered investment losses because the 
defendant, GPT Management Holdings, had misled them into believing that 
the company was financially profitable and the defendant had failed to comply 
with the continuous disclosure obligations under the legislation.     
At the end of the hearing and before a final judgment was handed down, 
the defendant however agreed to settle the claims.  One of the terms in the 
settlement proposal, prepared by the litigation funder, was that the funder’s 
commission be deducted from the amounts received by all shareholders, 
including those 8% of the shareholders who did not sign the funding agreement 
but had benefited from the class action.  Gordon J rejected that term in the 
proposal on the basis that the litigation funder had made a commercial decision 
to fund the class action with only 92% of the shareholders, and thus it would 
not be fair on the 8% of the shareholders to pay 25-30% of the commission 
when they had not entered into any agreement.69 
It was clear that the court was prepared to allow the 8% of the free riders to 
benefit from the class action.  However, to ensure that the 8% of the non-
funded shareholders would not receive more compensation than the 92% of the 
funded shareholders, Gordon J decided that the commission, which would have 
been deducted and paid to the commercial litigation funder under the 
settlement proposal, would be pooled and distributed on a pro rata basis to all 
class shareholders.70  The court approved the settlement sum of $75 million, 
which was to cover the shareholders’ entitlements and the litigation funder’s 
68 Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 626; and 
Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 1163 
69 Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 626, at 
para 57 
70 Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 626, at 
para 58. This method, known as the “equalisation factor”, has been used in a number of class 
action settlements. 
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commission.  As for the lawyers’ costs, the court approved the sum of $8.5 
million as audited by the court’s registrar.71 
The important difference between the present case and Multiplex is this.  In 
Multiplex, the court unanimously adopted the “closed” class approach and 
excluded the free riders from participating in the recovery process.  However, 
the court in GPT Management took a more liberal approach and treated all 
shareholders equally.  The court in GPT Management seemed to favour the 
approach in Dorajay and allowed all shareholders to participate equally in the 
share of the compensation, irrespective of whether they had opted into the 
funding arrangement. 
F What can be learnt from these shareholder class actions? 
There are two major issues arising from these commercially funded shareholder 
class actions. 
1 The “lock in” effect in a commercially funded class action 
There are arguments for and against commercial litigation funding.72  However, 
what is clear is that litigation funding has changed the characteristics of the 
“opt out” provision, to the point where the provision now has multiple 
interpretations.  In the literal sense, s.33J provides group members with an 
opportunity to opt out of the class action if they do not wish to be bound by the 
decision of the court.  However, as seen in the above cases and with the growing 
acceptance by the courts of the role of litigation funders, shareholders do not 
always have the choice of opting out of the class action because of the high costs 
imposed by the funder if they do decide to opt out.  There is no real 
opportunity for them to opt out when they have signed the funding agreement.  
If they choose to opt out as permitted by s.33J, they are to repay the litigation 
funder the amount they owe under the contract and such amount may include 
penalties, interests, and the like and the total amount could even be higher than 
the actual costs of the proceedings.  In effect, many group members are locked 
into the class action when they choose to opt into the funding arrangement.  In 
short, when a litigation funder is involved in the class action, s.33J is ineffective 
as a tool for opting out.  There is no real choice for group members to opt out. 
2  Inconsistency in the decisions between Dorajay and Multiplex 
In Dorajay, unless members had elected to opt out of the class action as 
permitted under s.33J, it was clear to the court that under Part IVA all group 
71 Modtech Engineering Pty Limited v GPT Management Holdings Limited [2013] FCA 1163 
72 See report from Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report on Access to Justice Arrangements, 
Volume 2, Final Report No 72, 5 September 2014, Canberra, Recommendation 18.2 at page 633.  
This Report was released for public viewing on 3rd December 2014. 
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members were entitled to make a claim for a share of the win, regardless of 
whether they were from the funded or non-funded groups.    
In Multiplex, both the original and the appellate courts provided a different 
interpretation to the class action procedure and to the opt out mechanism 
under s.33J.  In Multiplex, it was possible for a class action to be structured in 
ways that the plaintiff would be representing either “some or all”  of the group 
members.  Since the plaintiff was in the funded group, the courts decided that 
the plaintiff was representing only those members who were also funded and 
were in the funded group, which the outcome was that the non-funded 
shareholders were not entitled to participate in the recovery scheme and were 
excluded from the class action.  Both the original and the appellant courts in 
Multiplex formed the view that s.33C enabled the plaintiff to represent “some 
or all” of the group members and held that these funded group members being 
represented could opt out of the class action at any time under s.33J.  It might 
be financially unattractive for them to opt out but it was not impossible. 
Clearly, there is inconsistency in the decisions between Dorajay and 
Multiplex.  The recent development of the commercial litigation funding 
industry has altered the scope of the opt out mechanism in s.33J.  While the 
litigation funding arrangement in Multiplex only allowed members to join into 
that group before the commencement of the class action and those members 
could later opt out of the proceedings; the group membership in Dorajay could 
change anytime until the settlement date.  In other words, the Multiplex 
decision excluded the free riders while the Dorajay decision welcomed the free 
riders to join the class action at anytime up until the court closed the case for 
settlement.  In line with the Dorajay approach,   the court in GPT Management 
did not exclude the non-funded members from an entitlement to compensation.   
This inconsistency may be best resolved through legislative intervention.  
The question to be considered is whether there is any point in retaining the 
current wording in s.33J given that group members are not free to opt out of 
the funded class action and that the court could exclude some group members 
from the class action.  It may be fair to say for now that the opt out model 
continues to apply under the current class action legislation in Australia, but 
because of the Full Federal Court decision in Multiplex, it is possible to 
structure a class definition as a closed class under limited circumstances. 
V  IS REFORM  NECESSARY? 
The view of the author is that the class action procedure in Part IVA of the 
FCAA is in need of reform.  Below explains the reasons.     
A Lack of clarity in the term “opt out” 
First, the opt out provision referred to in s.33J is ambiguous.  Section 33J(2) 
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states very simply that a “group member may opt out of the representative 
proceeding by written notice given under the Rules of Court before the date so 
fixed”.  Without further information to clarify the scope or the intent, the 
provision could lead to multiple interpretations.   
One interpretation is that all group members who have not opted out of 
the class action as permitted by s.33J are entitled to make a claim for a share of 
the net recovery if there is a successful outcome in the class action.  The 
difficulty with this interpretation is when a class action is commercially funded, 
there is likely to be two groups of members – the funded group and the non-
funded group.  The funded group members are those who have signed the 
funding agreement as a way of showing their support for the class action. The 
non-funded group members are essentially the free riders.  The uncertainty in 
s.33J relates to the issue of free riders, whether it is the intent of the legislature 
to exclude them (or not) from the class action.  The difficulty is considering 
whether the non-funded group members should be given a free ride at the 
expense of the funded group members who have signed the funding agreement 
and have shown support for the class action.  There is no provision in Part IVA 
of the FCAA to assist in the understanding of the logic behind the wording of 
s.33J.  Section 33J does not make a distinction between the funded group 
members and non-funded group members. 
Another interpretation may be illustrated by considering the conflicting 
outcomes in Dorajay and in Multiplex.  In Dorajay, unless group members had 
decided to opt out, all groups members were entitled to a share of the 
compensation in the commercially funded class action regardless of whether 
they were from the funded or non-funded group; and this approach was 
favoured by a subsequent case in GPT Management.  In Multiplex, it was made 
clear that the free riders would be excluded from receiving any benefit in the 
commercially funded class action.  This is translated to mean that if they chose 
not to opt into the funding arrangement then they would be removed from the 
recovery process and would have no chance of deciding whether to opt out of 
the class action.   
The lack of clarity in the opt-out provision in s.33J may be explained 
further by comparing the two judgments of Finkelstein J in shareholder class 
action cases.  In 2005 in an unreported case of Cadence Asset Management Pty 
Ltd v. Concept Sports Limited,73 Finkelstein J declined to allow the class action 
to continue.  His view was that both the litigation funding agreement and the 
lawyers’ retainer agreement had created an “opt in” mechanism.  His Honour 
concluded that this practice was inconsistent with the “opt out” mechanism 
under s.33J, in that group members were not given an opportunity to opt out.  
73 Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v. Concept Sports Limited (unreported, Federal Court of 
Australia, Finkelstein J, decision 23 December 2005). The case was settled out of court in 
October 2006. 
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However, two years later in 2007 in the case of Multiplex, Finkelstein J changed 
his view and permitted the commercially funded class action to continue, 
saying that “the action would probably not have gotten off the ground” if there 
were no litigation funder involved.74  The change of view by Finkelstein J could 
be because of the 2006 decision in Fostif, where the High Court had approved a 
commercially funded retailer class action for the first time in history. 
B Defendant under pressure to settle 
The second reason for the need to improve the class action procedure relates to 
the premature settlement of the class action, that the defendant is often under 
pressure to settle the class action before a full hearing or before a final court 
judgment.  Currently there are far too many class action cases aborted half way 
into the court hearing, with the defendant elected to settle and pay 
compensation.75  This is not to say that the defendant in a class action has no 
case to answer, but rather the defendant has no choice but to go for an 
approved out of court settlement as this is its only best solution under a difficult 
situation.    
Indeed, the reality is that any form of litigation is an unwanted distraction; 
it takes away the defendant’s time and resources from dealing with the more 
important day-to-day business.  Protracted litigation could further jeopardise 
the defendant’s reputation and goodwill in its business.  There are other factors 
adding further pressure on the defendant to settle the class action prematurely.  
The defendant is well aware that the main objective of a commercial litigation 
funder is to make money from funding the class action and so the funder would 
go to any length to ensure a successful outcome in the class action, including 
appealing to a higher court if necessary.  The defendant also knows that in an 
opt out class action, if the case continues long enough, the prospect of the class 
size becoming larger is inevitable, as more group members will hear about the 
case in the news and will decide to participate in the recovery process, making it 
more expensive for the defendant to settle all the claims.   
At the same time, the litigation funder is also aware of the defendant’s 
weaknesses, and the funder would use these weaknesses as a strategic weapon to 
force a settlement upon the defendant.  In an overall scheme of things, it would 
be a cheaper option for the defendant to agree to a settlement without 
admitting liabilities.  The reality is when shareholders engage a litigation funder 
to fund the class action, the defendant has no way out but to agree to the terms 
of settlement.  In this instance, there is no justice for the defendant.  One way of 
addressing this problem would be to amend the class action procedure, so that 
74 Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v. Multiplex Ltd [2007] FCA 1061, at para 34 
75 See V. Morabito, “Litigation Funders, Competing Class Actions, Opt Out Rates, Victorian Class 
Actions and Class Representatives”,  Australian Research Council, September 2010 (Second 
report)   
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the defence case can then be brought forward for a full court hearing.  The 
other approach would be to set a maximum fee that a litigation funder can 
charge when funding a class action. 
C Commercially funded class action is only for the benefit of lawyers and 
litigation funders 
A number of authors have commented that the current class action model is 
designed for the benefit of lawyers of the representative plaintiff and the 
litigation funder.76  One author observed that there is an “economic incentive” 
for the law firm to get the litigation funder involved in the class action.77  Group 
members who are entitled to receive compensation from a successful class 
action tend to receive very little benefit from the case.  Much of the recovery 
goes to the lawyers acting on behalf of the group members and to the litigation 
funder for helping to fund the class action.  In practice, group members are 
only entitled to a pro rata amount, which in real term if their shareholding in 
the company is relatively small and the pool of participating shareholders is 
large, the amount they will receive will be insignificant.  The other problem 
with the current class action model is that the representative plaintiff has no 
right of a greater amount of recovery than the other members in the group.  
One member in the group may have initiated a class action, but there is no 
financial reward for taking the lead.  The current model does not reflect how 
group members are to be compensated or how they are to achieve a fair 
outcome. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
This article has highlighted some difficulties with the operation of the “opt out” 
provision under s.33J.  An Australian class action with an “opt out” mechanism 
can easily be turned into an “opt in” class action when a litigation funder is 
involved.  It appears there is an inconsistency in the application of the opt-out 
provision.  In some cases, the courts had allowed all group members, both 
funded and non-funded members, to participate in the recovery process unless 
the members have chosen to opt out of the class proceeding.  By contrast, in the 
case of Multiplex, the court had excluded non-funded group members known 
as free-riders from receiving any benefit in the successful shareholder class 
action. 
76 See, for example, S. Clark and C. Harris, “The push to reform class action procedure in 
Australia: Evolution or revolution?” (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 775; V. 
Morabito, “Class actions instituted only for the benefit of the clients of the class representative's 
solicitors” (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review, 5, at 1 and 38 
77 Cashman, P, “Class action on behalf of the clients: Is this permissible?” (2006) 80 Australian 
Law Journal 738, at 752 
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In addition, currently, the entities that benefit most from the class 
proceeding are the litigation funder and the group members’ legal 
representative, while individual group members receive only a small percentage 
of the recovery and if their shareholding in the company is small the pro rata 
amount of their recovery may be insignificant. 
Due to the widespread use of commercial litigation funding as a way to 
commence a class action and given that the High Court has approved such 
practice, perhaps now is the time for the legislature to address the anomalies in 
the class action provisions in Part IVA of the FCAA.  It is the view of the author 
that the only way for a commercially funded class action to be working 
effectively would be to revise and amend the class action procedure, making 
room to accommodate the role of commercial litigation funding. 
 

